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“The Damned Behaviorist” Versus French Phenomenologists:
Pierre Naville and the French Indigenization of Watson’s
Behaviorism
Rémy Amouroux and Nicolas Zaslawski
University of Lausanne
What do we know about the history of John Broadus Watson’s behaviorism outside of
its American context of production? In this article, using the French example, we
propose a study of some of the actors and debates that structured this history. Strangely
enough, it was not a “classic” experimental psychologist, but Pierre Naville (1904–
1993), a former surrealist, Marxist philosopher, and sociologist, who can be identified
as the initial promoter of Watson’s ideas in France. However, despite Naville’s unwav-
ering commitment to behaviorism, his weak position in the French intellectual com-
munity, combined with his idiosyncratic view of Watson’s work, led him to embody, as
he once described himself, the figure of “the damned behaviorist.” Indeed, when Naville
was unsuccessfully trying to introduce behaviorism into France, alternative theories
defended by philosophers such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty explic-
itly condemned Watson’s theory and met with rapid and major success. Both existen-
tialism and phenomenology were more in line than behaviorism with what could be
called the “French national narrative” of the immediate postwar. After the humiliation
of the occupation by the Nazis, the French audience was especially critical of any
deterministic view of behavior that could be seen as a justification for collaboration. By
contrast, Sartre’s ideas about absolute freedom and Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to preserve
subjectivity were far more acceptable at the time.
Keywords: behaviorism, France, phenomenology, existentialism, Pierre Naville
“You know, I never go to the restroom without Sartre!”1 So said Joseph Wolpe, the South
African pioneer of behavior therapy, to Jacques Rognant, the first French psychiatrist to
practice behavior therapy. However, although some behavior therapists like Wolpe were
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1 French original: “Vous savez, je ne vais jamais aux waters sans Jean-Paul Sartre!” (Jacques Rognant,
personal communication, July 15, 2015).
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1
enthusiastic about French culture,2 the reverse is certainly not true. It is indeed well known
that the French audience was particularly reluctant to adopt behaviorist ideas and was
extremely critical of them (Richelle, 1977, 2003). As a result, the first French translation
of Watson was not published until 1972 (Watson, 1972). It is worth mentioning that, in
comparison, the first German translation of Watson was released in 1930 (Watson, 1930).
This French lack of interest in, and reluctance toward, the field had remarkable effects on
the “psy” field in France in general and, more specifically, on the acceptance of behavior
therapy in the French-speaking context (Amouroux, 2017). Even nowadays, there is still
a “French exception” in the field of psychotherapy, which is notably characterized by a
disdain toward behaviorism’s legacy.3 Of course, behaviorist theories also triggered
criticism from outside French-speaking circles (Mills, 1998; Rutherford, 2009; Staub,
2011), but what is characteristic of the French context is that its criticisms of behaviorism
have been strong enough to significantly impact francophone psychological knowledge
and practices by dismissing behaviorism as an irrelevant and possibly suspicious set of
ideas.
In order to provide a better understanding of the specific fate of behaviorism in the
French context, we propose to study those who, despite the aforementioned widespread
disdain for behaviorism, were still interested in Watson’s work. Strangely enough, even
though French experimental psychologists, such as Henri Piéron, were interested in the
psychology of behavior (Fraisse, 1970; Littman, 1971), it was actually Pierre Naville
(1904–1993), a Marxist philosopher close to Russian revolutionary Léon Trotsky, actor in
the cultural movement of surrealism, and pioneer of the French Sociology of Work, who
can be identified as the initial promoter of Watson’s ideas in France. This could appear
surprising, especially when one recalls that behaviorism is neither usually associated with
any artistic connotation, nor deemed to encompass any theoretical connection with
Marxism, nor usually seen as a useful framework to understand the evolution of the labor
market.
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that Naville was centrally involved in a vigorous
public and private debate with philosophers Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
and yet has since been almost completely forgotten by the French psychology community.
Conversely, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty are still internationally well known as intellectuals
nowadays and regarded as the two main initiators of French existentialism and phenom-
enology.4 We contend that these two matters of fact—Naville’s oblivion and Sartre’s and
Merleau-Ponty’s celebrity—are interrelated. More specifically, in this article, we argue
that the difficult reception of behaviorism in the French context could be seen as the
consequence of the success of French phenomenology. Overall, we show that Naville’s
original approach to Watson’s work, combined with the sudden rise and rapid success of
existentialism and phenomenology, as well as the very specific political and philosophical
2 In his correspondence with Rognant, Wolpe often tried to write in French and confessed his interest in
French literature. For instance, about Sartre’s novel Les jeux sont faits [The Chips Are Down] (Sartre, 1947b),
he expressed his admiration towards Sartre’s “clear and beautiful writing” (French original: “son écriture est si
belle et claire”) (Wolpe, 1972). Wolpe also published an article in which he claimed that 19th-century French
psychiatrist François Leuret could be seen as a “progenitor” of behavior therapy (Wolpe & Theriault, 1971).
3 Notable examples being the INSERM report on psychotherapies, which supported cognitive behavior
therapy (CBT) and led to a media debate (INSERM, 2004); the publication of the scandalous Livre noir de la
psychanalyse [The Black Book of Psychoanalysis] (Meyer, 2005), which strengthened this media debate and led
to the so-called “psy war” (Nathan, 2006); the release of the film Le mur [The Wall] (Robert, 2011), which
criticized psychoanalytical theories of autism, supported CBT, and led to a trial with wide media coverage; or
even the more recent Autisme [Autism] plan of 2013 (Carlotti, 2013), which once again brought to attention
francophone particularities regarding the management of autism.
4 For a theoretical examination of the potential relationships between phenomenology, existentialism, and
behaviorism, see Kvale and Grenness (1967), Corriveau (1972), and Morf (1998). About the theoretical
relationship between phenomenology and existentialism, we choose not to distinguish between them in this
article, even if this is questionable; see Bayer (1962) and Stewart (1998).
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context of postwar France, played a major role in the difficult indigenization of behav-
iorism in the French context.
There currently exists no research providing an overview of the history of the reception
of Watson’s work in the French context. Our work aims at filling this historiographical
gap. We achieve this by adopting a decentered view of behaviorism, for we explore its
diffusion outside its original context of production (Pickren, 2009). Our aim is therefore
not only to build up a history of the French reception of behaviorism but also to clarify
the history of Watson’s theory itself by exposing particular francophone features. We are
also mindful of the philosophical issues raised by the introduction of behaviorism in the
French context. Indeed, as recently proposed by Shamdasani (2017), “in the twentieth
century, psychotherapy has been an ontology-making practice” (p. 367), in which behav-
iorism can be seen as an “optional ontology,”5 among others possibilities.
We first introduce Pierre Naville by giving a brief overview of his career, and
demonstrate that Watson’s behaviorism is the common theme among his eclectic interests.
Then, we describe the debate about behavior between Naville, Jean-Paul Sartre, and
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. As we outline, French phenomenologists explicitly condemned
Watson’s theory from not only from a philosophical but also, and most importantly, from
a political point of view. Finally, in a broader perspective, we explore the French
specificity of the reception and indigenization of Watson’s behaviorism. We pay particular
attention to the crucial role of the academic and political contexts and outline the
unexpected literary fate of behaviorism in France.
The Strange Career of Pierre Naville
Finding the “Supreme Science”
Briefly recounting Naville’s career and finding a logic accounting for his eclectic
choices or interests might appear difficult.6 Nevertheless, when one carefully considers his
career as well as his allegedly dispersed writings, one will actually encounter behaviorism
as the common theme always structuring his work and, therefore, hopefully providing us
with a reliable logic able to account for Naville’s erratic career. Interestingly enough,
although every biographical work about Naville explicitly mentions his continuous
interest in Watson, most of these works interpret this very interest as an oddity. For
instance, Cuenot (2017a) claimed that the reasons for Naville’s behaviorist thinking are
ideological rather than scientific. In line with Cuenot, Huteau (1997) explicitly stated that
Naville’s behaviorism is mainly of a metaphorical species rather than an indication of
rigorous intellectual work. As a result of such a widespread preconceived view, Naville’s
behaviorism is hardly ever understood as a stepping-stone of his intellectual career but
rather as a sign of his eccentricity. By contrast, like the sociologist and Naville’s former
colleague Pierre Rolle, we think that there actually are good reasons to claim that
Watson’s behaviorism was the major influence on Naville’s work (Rolle, 1997b) and that,
far from being a sign of alleged eccentricity, this influence actually encompasses genuine
intellectual and anthropological stakes. One should indeed not forget that Naville himself
5 Shamdasani (2017) defined optional ontology as follows: “conceptions not only of the reasons for one’s
maladies and how to be cured of them, but of how to be well and take up one’s place in society and the world”
(p. 375).
6 For more details about Naville’s work and career, see Cuenot (2017a, 2017b), Blum and Le Dantec (2007),
and Eliard (1996).
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once wrote that “behaviorism can then, in the end, be considered as the supreme science
of Man”7 (Naville, 1963a, p. 367), and he considered behaviorism as encompassing a
rigorous epistemological potential. At the end of his career, Naville stated his position as
follows: “My adherence to behavior analysis dates from 1922, when I met the work of
Watson. And my adherence to the surrealist movement’s practices and to Marx’s social
analysis did not alter my original behaviorism”8 (Bienaimé, 2010, p. 384; letter from P.
Naville to D. Bienaimé, May 6, 1991).
In this short biographical sketch, we consequently explore the role played by behav-
iorism in what may otherwise appear as a “strange,” or at least erratic, career: Naville was
successively a philosopher, a poet, a politician, a psychologist, and ended up a sociologist.
Acting as a Revolutionary
Pierre Naville was born in 1903 in Paris to a family of Swiss Protestant bankers with
personal connections within the literary world (Cuenot, 2017a). His father was notably a
close friend of André Gide, a French author and winner of the Nobel Prize for literature
in 1947. On April 6, 1922, while still a student in philosophy at the Sorbonne in Paris,
Naville was a direct witness to the famous debate between Albert Einstein and Henri
Bergson about the nature of time. Until then, Naville had always been fascinated by the
philosophy of Bergson. However, the disarray provoked by the scientific theory of
relativity on Bergson’s spiritualism convinced Naville that philosophy must be challenged
by science to prevent it from becoming mere mysticism. As a result, he decided to start
studying natural sciences and mathematics. It is presumably while studying biology that
he became acquainted with the work of John Watson for the first time. This encounter with
behaviorism changed his mind to the extent that Naville ended up being a straightforward
critic of Bergson’s philosophy and even plainly and simply abandoned the concept of
spirit. Disappointed with academia, he interrupted his study in philosophy: Naville wanted
to commit himself to concrete actions.
In 1924, at the age of 21, Naville got involved in the nascent surrealist movement.
Surrealism was an avant-garde cultural movement that began in the early 1920s in
France, notably with André Breton. The surrealists claimed to be revolutionary in their
approach to writing and visual artwork (Durozoi, 2009). There, Naville met his future
wife, Denise Lévy, a committed intellectual, muse of Breton and of the surrealist
group, and notably the translator of German texts by Friedrich Engels and Friedrich
Hölderlin (Kalinowski, 2007). Naville also became coeditor of La Révolution Surré-
aliste [The Surrealist Revolution], the official publication of the movement. With
other surrealists like Breton and Antonin Artaud, he participated in the establishment
of the Bureau de la Recherche Surréaliste [Office of Surrealist Research], where he
invited the public at large to practice automatic writing. Naville even wrote a
book—Les reines de la main gauche (Naville, 1924) [The Queens of the Left
Hand]— using automatic writing.9 Contrary to other surrealists, and especially to
Breton, Naville did not regard Sigmund Freud’s work as relevant to really under-
standing the mechanisms underlying automatic writing.10 Naville rather claimed that
7 French original: “la science du comportement peut donc être considérée en définitive comme la science
suprême de l’homme.”
8 French original: “Mon adhésion aà l’analyse du comportement physique date de 1922, lorsque j’ai connu les
travaux de Watson. Et mon adhésion aà la pratique du Mouvement Surréaliste et aux analyses sociales de Marx
ne m’a pas fait abandonner mon behaviorisme initial.”
9 Interestingly, Naville later wrote several articles as a psychologist about the development of writing skills
in children (Naville, 1950a, 1950b).
10 However, psychoanalysis was not the only theoretical source for the surrealist group. Indeed, as demon-
strated by Bacopoulos-Viau (2012), the influence of French psychiatrist Pierre Janet—author of L‘automatisme
psychologique [Psychological Automatism] (Janet, 1889)—was silenced by Breton.
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
4 AMOUROUX AND ZASLAWSKI
AQ: 9
Fn7
AQ: 10
Fn8
AQ:11,12
AQ: 13
Fn9
Fn10
AQ: 41
tapraid5/zhp-hips/zhp-hips/zhp99918/zhp2375d18z xppws S1 5/24/19 9:13 Art: 2019-0306 APA NLM
Watson’s behaviorism was the best theoretical option to understand artistic processes
of creation. According to him, in other words, there was no unconscious level of
explanation that could be accessed by means of automatic writing. In practice, he
thought that the process runs entirely differently: “In sum, instead of unveiling some
unknown or unconscious world which is hiding, automatic writing had to tend to
create a universe of words, where the universe of our practical and utilitarian
perceptions finds itself fully disoriented”11 (Naville, 1977, p. 135).
To put it briefly, automatic writing should enable one to temporarily inhibit one’s
memories, habits, and conditionings, and therefore has to be considered as a unique
source of genuine artistic creation. This point of view was, however, clearly not the
classic one in behaviorist circles. Indeed, a few years later, a promising junior fellow
at Harvard University and future champion of behaviorism named Burrhus Frederic
Skinner published an article in the Atlantic Monthly in which he strongly criticized the
use of automatic writing in art (Skinner, 1934). Using the example of a series of
experiments on automatic writing reported by Gertrude Stein, Skinner claimed that
this technique is only able to provide us with nonsense and meaningless products.
In the late 1920s, Naville began to think that surrealism was not politically invested
enough to be really revolutionary. He tried to convince the surrealist group to adopt
a strict Marxist paradigm and published a brochure entitled La Révolution et les
intellectuels, que peuvent faire les surréalistes? [Revolution and Intellectuals: What
Can Surrealists Do?]. Naville then pushed the surrealists to make a crucial choice
between negative anarchism and Marxism, and in his opinion, they made the wrong
choice. As a result, he got angry with Breton and left the surrealist group. In 1926,
Naville decided to join the Communist Party and became coeditor of Clarté [Clarity],
a communist journal. One year later, he met Leon Trotsky, and they became close
friends.12 Naville published anti-Stalinist articles in Clarté and was in no time
consequently expelled from the Communist Party for deviationism. Initially close to
the French Trotskyist group, he finally parted from them in the late 1930s. However,
until the end of his life, he actively participated in French political life and vigorously
defended a non-Stalinist Marxist point of view.13
Thinking With Watson
At the beginning of the Second World War, Naville stayed in Paris, where he found the
time to resume studying philosophy. He then decided to begin, without being able to
finish, a doctorate under the supervision of French Gestalt psychologist Paul Guillaume
and started translating the work of Watson. Unfortunately, in April 1940, after discovering
his status of political dissident, the French army sent Naville to the Front in a regiment
composed of communists, anarchists, and syndicalists. A few weeks later, he was taken
prisoner by the German army. In the prisoner-of-war camp, he became seriously ill and
was eventually freed. Back in Paris, he found himself politically isolated because both the
Stalinists and the Trotskyists considered him as a traitor to their political views. Still
interested in psychology, he studied to become a vocational psychologist and published a
series of books dealing with materialism, behaviorism, and Marxism. In La psychologie,
science du comportement: Le béhaviorisme de Watson [Psychology, Science of Behavior:
Watson’s Behaviorism] (Naville, 1942), Naville introduced Watson’s ideas to the French
11 French original: “En somme, plutôt que de révéler quelque monde inconnu ou inconscient qui se cache,
l’écriture automatique devait tendre aà créer un univers de mots où l’univers de nos perceptions pratiques et
utilitaires se trouve intégralement désorienté.”
12 Pierre and Denise Naville published several articles, translations, prefaces, and books about Trotsky (see
Marie, 2007).
13 For a complete account of Naville’s political career and especially his intellectual relationship with Trotsky,
see Cuenot (2017a, 2017b).
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readership.14 In D’Holbach et la philosophie scientifique au XVIIIe siècle [D’Holbach and
the Scientific Philosophy of the 18th Century] (Naville, 1943), he claimed that the Baron
d’Holbach (1723–1789), a French-German materialist philosopher close to the Encyclo-
pedist circle, was the forerunner of behaviorism.15 A few years later, Naville published
Psychologie, marxisme, matérialisme [Psychology, Marxism, Materialism] (Naville,
1946a), in which he explicitly stated that behaviorism was the only acceptable psychology
from a Marxist and materialist point of view.16
Even if he did not really work as a “classic” behaviorist psychologist, Naville
faithfully adopted Watson’s view on psychology, especially his dismissal of con-
sciousness as a relevant entity or concept for psychology. He considered what is
considered consciousness an abstraction lacking any kind of explanatory depth.
Consequently, according to Naville, there is no such thing as an “autonomous mind”
but only complex relationships establishing themselves between behavior and its
environment. Fully aware of the ontological questions raised by this theoretical
option, Naville clarified that he was not defending a perspective according to which
thought would be a product of the brain but rather clearly stated that there is no such
thing as thought (Naville, 1946a, 1963a). In other words, what we commonly call
thought or idea is an abstract construct that is not produced by an individual entity but
results from complex relationships between individuals and their environment, fol-
lowing the model of the conditional reflex.
However, even if he seemed to endorse a traditional form of behaviorism, one should
acknowledge that Naville’s understanding of Watson was sometimes very original, not to
say idiosyncratic, regarding behaviorist doxa. More specifically, he wanted to bring to
light the political implications of Watson’s theory:
Watson has admitted the physical nature of mankind, with every one of its modalities, is precisely
the result and component of a certain number of influences indicating environment. . . . But we can
go further. This environment, in the end, is also defined as a social environment, on a class ground.
For man at birth does not open his eyes to a virgin universe: he enters an already old world, after a
succession of millions of generations. . . . In short, he is born in a society, which has not been defined
by Watson, but which is capitalist society divided into social classes. Thus, all his further intellectual
14 Initially, Naville’s project was to translate Behaviorism (Watson, 1925), but under the special conditions
of German-occupied France, it was forbidden to publish any book from an Allied author. To circumvent this law,
Naville decided to alter the text slightly and to publish it under his own name. The first “real” translation of
Watson was not released until 1972 (Watson, 1972).
15 The Baron d’Holbach is notably the author of Système de la Nature (1770) [System of Nature], in which
he notably stated that God does not exist, free will is an illusion, and that there is no soul without a living body.
In his book about d’Holbach, Naville extensively commented on his conception of freedom in a way that is
reminiscent of what Burrhus Frederic Skinner would later claim (see Skinner, 1971, pp. 31–47):
There is no free will. It is another name for a particular form of necessity: one that is “enclosed within man
himself.” Being free, if one wants to provide this expression with a meaning, “amounts to giving up before
necessary motives we are bearing in ourselves.” These two wordings of course reflect a certain embarrassment.
For they simply mean that being free is being constrained in a certain way. . . . Free will amounts to subduing
to what is useful to one, to impulses conducive to maintaining one’s equilibrium; yielding to unfortunate
impulses would be rough necessity.
French original:
il n’y a pas de liberté. C’est un autre nom pour une forme particulière de nécessité: celle qui est “renfermée
au-dedans de l’homme lui-même.” ^Etre libre, si l’on veut donner un sens aà l’expression, “c’est céder aà des motifs
nécessaires que nous portons en nous-même.” Ces deux formules reflètent évidemment un certain embarras. Car elles
signifient tout simplement qu’être libre, c’est être contraint d’une certaine façon. . . . La liberté consiste aà se soumettre
aà ce qui est utile aà l’être, aux impulsions qui sont favorables aà son maintien en équilibre; céder aux impulsions
fâcheuses serait la nécessité brute. (Naville, 1943, p. 303)
16 Naville considered that neither Karl Marx nor Friedrich Engels actually proposed a specific theory of psychol-
ogy, but he thought that with behaviorism, psychology could now be materialist and, consequently, Marxist.
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development will be explained, under a certain angle, by the class factors which will have impacted
it.17 (Naville, 1947, p. 128)
Herein lies the reason for Naville’s fascination with behaviorism. Indeed, with this new
theory, he thought that he would be able to go further than Marx and propose a genuine
Marxist psychology.
In 1946, Naville wrote a letter to Watson and sent him a copy of his book about
behaviorism published in 1942. With the greatest reverence, he explained to Watson that
“his many French admirers” wanted to know why he was no longer publishing within the
“psy” field and even asked him if he would agree to write a article for a French journal
(Naville, 1946b). Unfortunately, Watson never replied; Naville simply wrote in the margin
of a copy kept in his personal archives: “no answer.” Around the same time, he wrote a
book about vocational psychology (Naville, 1945) in which he offered a radical critique
of the idea of innate vocational aptitude itself. Indeed, as a behaviorist, he claimed that
aptitudes are never innate but acquired. Thus, inevitably, he was cast out from French
vocational psychologist circles.18
Ultimately, it is as a sociologist that he pursued and ended his academic career. Here
again, the influence of behaviorism is striking. Indeed, Naville became a specialist in the
social effect of automation in industry (Naville, 1963b). Naville’s idea was that automa-
tion is neither good nor bad in itself. He rather claimed that it merely created new work
conditions and that it is our duty to choose which form of labor organization we want to
develop with regards to these conditions. Naville stated that there was a direct link
between his interest in automatic writing as a surrealist and automation as a sociologist.
In a article published in 1960, he claimed that “between spontaneous and automatic, there
is no antinomy”19 (Naville, 1960, p. 283). This enigmatic sentence was actually written to
state that automatism, either in industry, art, and, more generally, human behavior, is not
necessarily a restriction of freedom. It might even be quite the contrary. As Pierre Rolle
noticed, “automatic behavior in this case indicates the perfection of elementary gestures
and freedom gained by the body”20 (Rolle, 1997a, p. 211).
In this section, we have showed that throughout his life, Naville maintained a strong
interest in behaviorism. Thus, we demonstrated that, according to Naville, behaviorism
was not only relevant for psychologists but also for philosophers, politicians, sociologists,
and even surrealists. However, we also suggested that Naville’s behaviorism was clearly
very original, if not idiosyncratic. As discussed in the next section, in his opinion,
behaviorism was less a specific psychological theory or method than a conceptual
philosophical tool relevant for political purposes.
17 French original:
Watson a admis que la nature physique de l’homme avec toutes ses modalités, est justement la résultante
et la composante d’un certain nombre d’influences qui expriment le milieu. . . . Mais nous pouvons aller plus
loin. Ce milieu, en fin de compte, se définit aussi comme milieu social, sur un terrain de classe. Car l’homme
qui nait n’ouvre pas les yeux sur un univers vierge: il entre dans un monde déjaà vieux, après une succession de
millions de générations . . . en un mot, il nait dans une société, que Watson n’a pas définie, mais qui est la société
capitaliste divisée en classes. Dès lors tout son développement intellectuel ultérieur s’expliquera sous un certain
angle par les facteurs de classe qui y auront influé.
18 Overall, with the exception of psychologist René Zazzo, Naville’s behaviorism sometimes led him to
difficult relationships with other French psychologists. Naville’s criticism of aptitude led him to quarrel with
Piéron, who was the preeminent academic psychologist at that time. For a more detailed study of Naville’s work
as a vocational psychologist and his relationship with Zazzo and Piéron, see Hocquard (1996) and Huteau (1997).
19 French original: “entre le spontané et l’automatique, il n’y a pas d’antinomie.”
20 French original: “L’automatisme du comportement marque dans ce cas la perfection des gestes élémen-
taires et la liberté gagnée de l’organisme.”
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Naville Versus Sartre and Merleau-Ponty
The Root of the Conflict
In order to describe the specificity of the French reception of Watson’s work, we
explore the vigorous philosophical debate about behaviorism that involved Naville, Sartre,
and Merleau-Ponty. This debate started with a series of publications about behavior,
beginning with Naville’s book about Watson. A few months later, two famous books were
published in France that explicitly condemned behaviorism: The Structure of Behavior by
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1942), and Being and Nothingness by Jean-Paul Sartre (1943). In
the midst of the Second World War, in Nazi-occupied France, these three books marked
the beginning of an intensive discussion about consciousness, freedom, and political
commitment between three philosophers who knew each other very well and often
discussed politics and philosophy, whether privately—notably at the café Le Balzar in the
Quartier latin [Latin quarter], where existentialist philosophers were a regular fixture at
that time—or by means of journals, especially in Les Temps Modernes [The Modern
Times], founded by Sartre and in La Revue Internationale [The International Review],
founded by Naville. It is well known that Sartre and Merleau-Ponty were two major actors
in French existentialism and phenomenology. Even though there are some major differ-
ences between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophies, they nevertheless both acknowl-
edged the crucial role played by consciousness, experience, and intentionality in human
behavior, whether it was “transcending itself to reach an object”21 (Sartre, 1943, p. 18) for
Sartre or “the structure of behavior”22 (Merleau-Ponty, 1942, p. 238) and “integration of
existence”23 (Merleau-Ponty, 1942, p. 199) for Merleau-Ponty. As a consequence, both
straightforwardly disagreed with Watson’s rejection of consciousness. In contrast, Naville
claimed that consciousness is a mere abstraction that is not necessary to understand human
behavior. Interestingly enough, what could have remained a technical, philosophical, or
psychological question about consciousness shifted toward a heated political debate about
freedom and political commitment that lasted for almost 20 years.
The structure of this debate also has to be understood from the perspective of the
understanding of Marxian philosophy specific to each of these three philosophers. Indeed,
although all of them could be considered leftists, each one had his own particular sense
of leftism. From this perspective, it is worth recalling that the relations between Sartre and
the Parti Communiste Français (PCF) [French Communist Party] were complex. Even
though he was first met with much distrust by the PCF after 1945, Sartre nevertheless
progressively became a fellow traveler of the movement, especially after the mid-1950s.
In contrast, as an expelled member, friend of Trotsky, and critic of Stalin, Naville was a
sworn enemy of the PCF. As for Merleau-Ponty, he primarily developed a “wait-and-see”
attitude toward Marxism (Merleau-Ponty, 1947), later leading him to a more explicitly
critical position that he himself described as “a-communism” and criticized Sartre for his
“ultra-Bolshevism” (Merleau-Ponty, 1955). Moreover, one also has to keep in mind that
Naville proposed an original, perhaps iconoclastic, view of Marxian philosophy. Contrary
to most of his contemporaries, who mostly saw a philosopher in Marx, he claimed that the
author of Das Capital [Capital] was first and foremost a scientist who had tried precisely
to overcome philosophy through science. As a result, it is not surprising that Naville has
been accused of being a positivist. Indeed, he fully endorsed a materialist and determinist
theoretical perspective, whereas Sartre and Merleau-Ponty saw it as a genuine philosoph-
ical dead end.
21 French original: “en ce qu’elle se transcende pour atteindre un objet.”
22 French original: “la structure du comportement.”
23 French original: “ intégration de l’existence.”
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Sartre, Existentialism, and Freedom
A major controversy between Sartre and Naville motivated the publication of
several books and articles (Spurk, 1997). The debate began on October 29, 1945, after
a famous lecture given by Sartre in which he introduced existentialism to the French
audience. One year later, he published a little book, a verbatim transcription of the
lecture, entitled Existentialism is a Humanism (Sartre, 1946a). The conference and the
book were two instant public successes and even immortalized in a famous novel by
Boris Vian (1947). Sartre’s goal at this conference was to explain existentialism to a
broader audience and in a simplified form compared with his fully developed and
complex Being and Nothingness (Sartre, 1943). Sartre’s perspective is well known:
For his consciousness being “nothingness,” Man “escapes the causal order of the
world, he unglues himself from being”24 (Sartre, 1943, p. 58). As a consequence,
Sartre wrote, “What I call freedom is therefore impossible to distinguish from
human-reality’s being”25 (Sartre, 1943, p. 60); thus, as he would later write, Man is
“condemned to be free” (Sartre, 1983, p. 447). In Existentialism is a Humanism, in
order to make his philosophy more accessible to a wide audience, Sartre took concrete
examples connected to the wartime experience. In particular, he told the story of a
student of his, a young man who was facing a dilemma during the Second World War:
Should he care for his mother, who was isolated and without financial resources,
or should he join the Resistance against the Nazis? According to Sartre, the student
should make the choice by himself and would have to bear that responsibility, which
is precisely what Sartre meant by freedom in an existentialist perspective. Sartre
claimed, therefore, that he was not supposed to give any advice to the student. Yet the
text of the conference is followed by the transcript of a debate between Sartre and
Naville, which occurred just after the lecture. Throughout the discussion, Naville
objected that, in order to really help the student, one could not let him deal with his
dilemma alone. On the contrary, one had to help him understand the conditions and
consequences of both sides of the choice. Naville refused the attitude advocated by
Sartre, and, at the very end of the debate, said to him,
There was a need to answer him. I would have tried to inquire as to what he was capable of, to his
age, his financial possibilities, to examine his relationships with his mother. . . . I would have
encouraged him to do something.26 (Sartre, 1946a, p. 109)
Sartre answered, “If he comes for a piece of advice, he has chosen the answer already.
Practically, I could very well have given him advice; but since he was looking for
freedom, I wanted to let him decide”27 (Sartre, 1946a, p. 109).
According to Naville, one could not leave the student face to face with his choices.
On the contrary, one must actively help him to understand the potential causes and
consequences of his choices. In other words, Naville did not believe in freedom in an
existentialist perspective and claimed that one has to create one’s own conditions of
freedom. This was so important to him that, a few months later, he published a book
24 French original: “il échappe aà l’ordre causal du monde, il se désenglue de l’être.”
25 French original: “Ce que nous appelons liberté est donc impossible aà distinguer de l’être de la réalité-
humaine.”
26 French original: “Il fallait lui répondre. J’aurais essayé de m’enquérir de quoi il était capable, de son âge,
de ses possibilités financières, d’examiner ses rapports avec mère. . . . Je l’aurais engagé aà faire quelque chose.”
27 French original: “S’il vient demander un conseil, c’est qu’il a déjaà choisi la réponse. Pratiquement, j’aurais
très bien pu lui donner un conseil; mais puisqu’il cherchait la liberté, j’ai voulu le laisser decider.”
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entitled Les conditions de la liberté [The Conditions of Freedom], in which he
developed his critique of phenomenology and existentialism.28 Naville notably stated
that if Man was as free as Sartre claimed, this would imply that he should be held fully
responsible for the deeply unequal social world we are living in. On the contrary,
according to Naville, one could not be blamed for being subjected to all the social
determinisms and psychological conditionings that surround us. Paradoxically, to free
themselves, individuals should first become aware of their difficulties— or even their
inabilities—to naturally access freedom. Approximately at the same period, Sartre
(1946b) explained that, from his point of view, there was no contradiction between the
facts that the world is driven by physical laws and that human beings are free. In this
work, Sartre turned Naville’s argument around: In a strictly deterministic world, how
could one be a revolutionary? If everything is already written, what can one do? Sartre
ironically stressed that the determinism of materialists condemns them to be reac-
tionary.
Less than 10 years after this vivid discussion, the debate sparked up again between
Naville and Sartre. Indeed, Naville (1956a) published a book entitled L’intellectuel
communiste [The communist intellectual], with a pretty clear subtitle—aà propos de
Jean-Paul Sartre [about Jean-Paul Sartre]—in which he continued his discussion with the
existentialist philosopher. This book is notably composed of several articles published
against Sartre. Naville focused especially critically on Nekrassov (Sartre, 1956a), a recent
theater play written by Sartre in which he condemned anticommunism. Yet in the
mid-1950s, Sartre had become a leading intellectual figure of the PCF, and Naville tried
to demonstrate that this play illustrated Sartre’s uncritical allegiance to PCF Stalinism. A
few weeks before the publication of the “Khrushchev Report”—in which Khrushchev
denounced Stalin’s crimes and the cult of personality around him—Naville accused Sartre
of creating a philosophy justifying a political wait-and-see attitude:
Reducing the intellectual to the novelist, the playwright, the essayist, [Sartre] was assigning to him only
testimony as a function, a weak form of engagement. Little by little, repeated testimony turned into
compliance, and compliance with what? With the general directives of the Stalinian apparatus of the
Communist Party.29 (Naville, 1956a, p. 33)
According to Naville, this political weakness was the straightforward consequence of
Sartre’s understanding of subjectivity, consciousness, and freedom. By constantly stating
that consciousness centrally existed in human behavior and choices, Sartre’s philosophy
risked driving people to political passivity: “I cannot prevent myself from seeing that there
exists a secret bond between the statement of unconditioned subjectivity and the assurance
that what happens had to happen”30 (Naville, 1956a, p. 40).
This debate continued to rage and even culminated with the publication of two articles:
“Réponse aà Pierre Naville” [Answer to Pierre Naville] (Sartre, 1956b) and “Les nouvelles
mésaventures de Jean-Paul-Sartre” [The new adventures of Jean-Paul Sartre] (Naville, 1956b).
In his article, Sartre strongly blamed Naville for not being able to understand the intellectual
evolution of the world. He notably claimed that behaviorism was already an obsolete position.
28 The initial title was Phénoménologie de la phénoménologie [Phenomenology of Phenomenology] and 10
years later when he unsuccessfully tried to republish the book, he wanted to have the subtitle Critique of
Existentialism. In this book, Naville especially criticized Sartre and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophies (Pierre
Naville Papers, CEDIAS-Musée Social, Paris).
29 French original:
Réduisant l’intellectuel au romancier, au dramaturge, aà l’essayiste, [Sartre] ne lui assignait pour fonction
que le témoignage, forme faible de l’engagement. Peu aà peu le témoignage aà répétition s’est mué en acquiesce-
ment, et en acquiescement aà quoi? Aux directives générales de l’appareil stalinien du parti communiste.
30 French original: “Je ne peux m’empêcher de voir qu’il existe une secrète liaison entre l’affirmation de la
subjectivité inconditionnée et l’assurance que ce qui arrive devait arriver.”
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As for Naville, he repeated his earlier criticism toward Sartre’s “political quietism” and his
submissive attitude toward the PCF. When looking at this debate, it is worth noticing that,
according to Naville, Sartre’s existentialism led him to develop reactionary beliefs, whereas,
according to Sartre, Naville’s materialism and behaviorism are precisely what constitute a
reactionary political position.
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology, and Marxism
La structure du comportement [The Structure of Behavior] (Merleau-Ponty, 1942)
begins with what could be called a damning indictment of the behaviorist view of human
behavior. What is so wrong with behaviorism? According to Merleau-Ponty, Watson
falsely reduced behavior to its physiological components:
It is known that in Watson, following the classical antinomy, the negation of consciousness as an “internal
reality” is made to the benefit of physiology; behavior is reduced to the sum of reflexes and conditioned
reflexes between which no intrinsic connection is admitted. (Merleau-Ponty, 1967, p. 4)
However, as Naville noted, this is not exactly Watson’s claim. In Psychology From the
Standpoint of a Behaviorist, the founder of behaviorism even stated that it is perfectly
possible for a behaviorist to be ignorant of physiology and to have a “comprehensive and
accurate” (Watson, 1919, p. 195) understanding of emotions or human behavior. Merleau-
Ponty’s rough criticism of behaviorism presumably comes from the fact that he had no
first-hand reading of Watson’s texts. There is indeed not a single direct quote from Watson
in the entire Structure of Behavior, whereas other psychologists or physicians are widely
and directly quoted.31 Moreover, in a footnote, Merleau-Ponty admitted that he had just
learned in a book32 that came to him when La structure du comportement was in galley
proofs, that initially, Watson’s project was not to reduce behavior to physiology. How-
ever, despite an apparent contradiction, at the end of this footnote, Merleau-Ponty repeated
his criticism and claimed that although Watson had a “healthy and profound” intuition, he
ultimately turned into a materialist and therefore provided us with an inaccurate view of
the problem:
But what is healthy and profound in this intuition of behavior—that is, the vision of man as perpetual
debate and “explanation” with a physical and social world—found itself compromised by an impover-
ished philosophy. In reaction against the shadows of psychological intimacy, behaviorism for the most
part seeks recourse only in a physiological or even a physical explanation, without seeing that this
amounts to putting behavior back into the nervous system. In my opinion . . . when Watson spoke of
behavior he had in mind what others have called existence; but the new notion could receive its
philosophical status only if causal or mechanical thinking were abandoned for dialectical thinking.
(Merleau-Ponty, 1967, p. 226)
In his criticism of phenomenology and existentialism, Naville extensively discussed
Merleau-Ponty’s view of behaviorism and especially pointed to his debatable views on the
role of physiology in behaviorism. Naville also tried to demonstrate that phenomenology,
by refusing to fully acknowledge the role of determinism in human sciences, offered a
mystical vision of behavior:
The simple and conditioned reflex is philosophy’s pet hate. And why is that? Because it introduces
determinism into biological behavior on a human scale. . . . Reflex activity poses a capital form of bond
between animal organism and (internal and external) environment. Through it the organism ceases to be
31 For instance, Goldstein is directly quoted 54 times; Koffka, 32 times; Pavlov, 21 times; and Tolman seven
times.
32 Merleau-Ponty referred to Le béhaviourisme (Tilquin, 1942), an introduction to behaviorism published by
André Tilquin. Interestingly, Merleau-Ponty did not quote Naville’s book about Watson, although it had been
published 4 months before La structure du comportement (Noble, 2011).
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pure self-determination and becomes the seat of preferred reactions. This is what metaphysics, and
theology in particular, cannot tolerate, even under its existential shape.33 (Naville, 1947, p. 88)
According to Naville, phenomenology and existentialism were just new forms of the old
idealist philosophy. Moreover, one should not overlook that this ontological consideration
goes along with a political one. In that respect, Naville decided to hold a debate in his own
journal, La Revue Internationale. It seems that his idea was from the beginning to publicly
debate with Merleau-Ponty himself about phenomenology and Marxism. In 1945, Naville
tried to ask Merleau-Ponty to write a article for a special issue about Marxism and
philosophy (Merleau-Ponty, 1945b). First, Merleau-Ponty declined the invitation. How-
ever, he then agreed to possibly submit a article but only after the publication of the
special issue (Merleau-Ponty, 1945d). Eventually, Naville asked Jean Domarchi, an
economist, to write an article about phenomenology and Marxist economy, and Tran-
Duc-Thao, a Vietnamese phenomenologist,34 to write a more general article about
phenomenology and class struggle. Naville offered a long answer in two parts, entitled
“Marx ou Husserl,” published it in the following issues of his journal, and published it
again as a chapter in Les conditions de la liberté (Naville, 1947). He began with a critique
of Domarchi and Tran-Duc-Thao, but it seems that his real purpose was to debate with
Merleau-Ponty. Indeed, he ended his article with a criticism of Tran-Duc-Thao and
Merleau-Ponty’s claims that Marx’s analysis of society—and especially the role of the
proletariat35—did not square with reality any longer. Naville acknowledged that society
could change but he strongly disagreed with the idea that phenomenology could be
interesting for a “true” Marxian. On the contrary, he claimed that phenomenology would
lead to a subjective and partial interpretation: “Precisely, the international crisis of
proletarian classes has to be explained and solved from an economic, social, demographi-
cal, political, military analysis of our era, and not through resorting to ‘lived experiences,’
desperately locked into subjectivism”36 (Naville, 1947, p. 167). This is exactly the same
criticism that we presented earlier, now directed at Merleau-Ponty—phenomenology’s
rejection of determinism in human sciences led it to be blind to the role of context and to
social progressivism: “Pure metaphysics, abstract universality, always entails a reaction-
ary seed, a potential absolutism . . . If some followers of existentialism have joined the
resistance against Nazism, if they are republicans, even socialists, it is despite their
philosophy”37 (Naville, 1947, p. 189). A few months after Naville’s articles were pub-
lished, Merleau-Ponty finally agreed to write a contribution to the debate, without directly
33 French original:
Le réflexe simple et conditionné est la bête noire de la philosophie. Et pourquoi cela? Parce qu’il introduit
le déterminisme dans le comportement biologique aà l’échelle humaine. . . . L’activité réflexe constitue une forme
de liaison capitale entre l’organisme animal et le milieu (intérieur et extérieur). Par elle l’organisme cesse d’être
pure auto-détermination pour devenir le siège de réaction privilégiées. C’est ce que ne peut tolérer la métaphy-
sique et particulièrement la théologie, même sous sa forme existentielle.
34 For more information about Tran-Duc-Thao, see Benoist and Espagne (2013).
35 Naville quoted a article from Merleau-Ponty in Les Temps Modernes: “Proletariat as a class is too weakened to
remain by now an autonomous factor of history. We cannot have a Marxist proletarian politics in the classical manner
anymore, because it does not bite onto facts any more.” French original: “Le prolétariat comme classe est trop affaibli
pour demeurer aà présent un facteur autonome de l’histoire. Nous ne pouvons plus avoir une politique marxiste
prolétarienne aà la manière classique, parce qu’elle ne mord plus sur les faits” (Merleau-Ponty, 1956, p. 589).
36 French original: “Précisément la crise internationale des classes prolétariennes doit être expliquée et résolue
aà partir d’une analyse économique, sociale, démographique, politique, militaire de notre époque et non par le
recours aà des ‘expériences vécues,’ désespérément enfermées dans le subjectivisme.”
37 French original: “la métaphysique pure, l’universalité abstraite contient toujours un germe réactionnaire, un
absolutisme en puissance . . . Si des adeptes de l’existentialisme ont adhéré aà la résistance contre le nazisme, s’ils
sont républicains, voire socialistes, c’est en dépit de leur philosophie.”
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answering Naville’s attacks.38 In a letter to the philosopher Alphonse de Waelhens,
Merleau-Ponty explained his position:
Decidedly, no, I will not respond to Naville. I preferred making a small article on “Marxism and
philosophy,” of a positive feature, and relate to it a few general critiques of pseudo-Marxist scientism,
which is in my opinion something sickening.39 (Merleau-Ponty, 1946)
As a matter of fact, Merleau-Ponty’s article begins with a criticism of Naville’s materialism,
comparing him with Auguste Comte. Like the founder of positivism, Naville would want to
replace philosophy with science and “to reduce man to the state of a scientific object”40
(Merleau-Ponty, 1966, p. 221). Merleau-Ponty also turned the political argument around and
pointed out that Naville’s positivism actually led him to defend reactionary stances:
A priori, scientism seems a conservative idea since it causes us to mistake the merely momentary for the
eternal. Throughout the history of Marxism, in fact, the fetishism of science has always made its appearance
where the revolutionary conscience was faltering.41 (Merleau-Ponty, 1966, p. 223)
Overall, in his article, Merleau-Ponty tried to explain that we should overcome the
antithesis between mechanism and idealism and that this is precisely the philosophical
endeavor of phenomenology. In the conclusion, he tackled Naville’s critical attitude
toward philosophy, for it seems to be, according to Merleau-Ponty, more ideological than
genuinely scientific. Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty warned his readers of the risk such an
attitude entails: “Are we . . . going to look at philosophy through the police chief’s
glasses?”42 (Merleau-Ponty, 1966, p. 240).43
Interestingly, during the very same period of this heated public debate, another related
controversy was privately at play between the same actors. This one was about the arbitrary
imprisonment of Tran-Duc-Thao in September 1945. Immediately after his imprisonment,
Naville issued a petition and, notably, sent it to Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. The latter answered
that he and Sartre preferred to add some modifications to the text. Merleau-Ponty explained to
Naville:
Sartre was actually willing to sign your text and it is I who thought of writing out another one. Our goal has
to be, in my opinion, less to make a demonstration, inefficient on the political front, than obtaining Thao’s
release. This is why it seems appropriate to me to give your text, of Marxist inspiration, a “liberal” note likely
to collect a larger number of signatures.44 (Merleau-Ponty, 1945a)
Merleau-Ponty criticized Naville for his purely Marxist reading of the situation, which,
according to him, had to be further substantiated and, above all, could be potentially
dangerous for Tran-Duc-Thao. Conversely, Naville considered that Merleau-Ponty’s
38 This article entitled “Marxisme et philosophie” [Marxism and Philosophy] and originally published in 1946
in La Revue Internationale, was published again in Sens and non-sens (Merleau-Ponty, 1966).
39 French original: “Décidément non, je ne répondrai pas aà Naville. J’ai préféré faire un petit article sur
‘Marxisme et philosophie,’ de caractère positif, et y rattacher quelques critiques générales du scientisme
pseudo-marxiste qui est aà mon avis quelque chose d’écœurant.”
40 French original: “réduire l’homme aà la condition d’objet de science.”
41 French original: “A priori, le scientisme apparaît comme une conception conservatrice, puisqu’il nous ferait
prendre pour éternel ce qui n’est que momentané. En fait, dans l’histoire du marxisme, le fétichisme de la science
est toujours apparu du côté où fléchissait la conscience révolutionnaire.”
42 French original: “Allons-nous aà notre tour regarder la philosophie par les lunettes du commissaire de police?”
43 Claude Lefort, a philosopher close to Merleau-Ponty, proposed a more detailed critic of Naville’s behaviorism (Lefort,
1946).
44 French original:
“Sartre était en effet disposé aà signer votre texte et c’est moi qui ai pensé aà en rédiger un autre. Notre but doit être, aà
mon sens, moins de faire une manifestation, inefficace sur le plan politique que d’obtenir la libération de Thao. C’est
pourquoi il me parait indiqué de restituer aà votre texte, d’inspiration marxiste, un texte “liberal” capable de recueillir un plus
grand nombre de signatures.”
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attitude demonstrated lack of courage. In a very long letter addressed to Naville,
Merleau-Ponty, pushed to his very limits, told him a few home truths about the
discussion regarding Tran-Duc-Thao’s petitions: “I do not have sharp opinions and a
defaulting will. I am only asking myself what the future of Marxist-revolutionary
politics is, and I do not like bullshit, that’s all (I mean: dreams believing they are
truths).”45 (Merleau-Ponty, 1945c)
We could not find which of the two petitions was eventually published—probably
both. Tran-Duc-Thao was freed in December 1945. This anecdotal episode in any case
confirms the roughness of the debate between Naville versus Merleau-Ponty and
Sartre and also the entanglement of philosophical and political claims within a
theoretical endeavor. Finally, it is worth noting that Naville played a significant role
in the final break between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty. In 1953, the French behaviorist
submitted a two-part article to Les Temps Modernes entitled “Etats-Unis et contra-
dictions capitalistes” [The United States and Capitalist Contradictions], in which, as
a Marxist, he criticized capitalism (Naville, 1952, 1953). Merleau-Ponty, who was
then developing a criticism of communism, added a short note about the contradic-
tions of socialism in which he severely attacked Naville. However, in an authoritarian
manner, Sartre decided to remove Merleau-Ponty’s note. After several months of
political divergence between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, this event led to a final
quarrel between the two men. Ironically, as noted by Birchal, “it seems that neither
Sartre nor Merleau-Ponty had read the full article. In the second part, which appeared
five months later, Naville did indeed discuss the contradictions of the ‘socialist bloc’”
(Birchall, 2004, p. 123).
As we have shown here, the reception of behaviorism in France was linked to a
strong, if not violent, debate between Naville, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. Indeed,
according to Naville, phenomenology and existentialism ultimately led to the devel-
opment of reactionary beliefs, whereas according to Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, it was
Naville’s materialism and behaviorism that were intrinsically reactionary. As a result,
it seems that this controversy is not understandable if we consider it only as a
“classical” theoretical debate in psychology. On the contrary, we demonstrated that
the philosophical and political underlying issues are mostly what structured this
debate. In the following, in order to better understand what was at stake, we explore
the role of the context in which those thinkers were evolving.
Behaviorism in the Shadow of Existentialism and Phenomenology
In a Completely Different League
The vigorous debate presented above could mislead regarding Naville’s status and
fate. Even if the proponents of existentialism and phenomenology were set against
those of behaviorism, this does not actually mean that the two movements were
comparable at that time with regard to their public credit. Quite the contrary, the rapid
public and academic success of existentialism completely overshadowed Naville’s
attempt to popularize behaviorism. Based essentially on Sartre’s, Merleau-Ponty’s,
and Naville’s careers, we present a few details about the rapid development of
existentialism in France before comparing it with what happened to behaviorism.
There are indeed strong arguments to claim that the actors in this philosophical and
political debate were actually playing in completely different leagues. It is especially
true for Sartre, who is often described not only as an important philosopher but also
45 French original: “Je n’ai pas des opinions nettes et une volonté défaillante. Je me demande seulement quel
est l’avenir de la politique marxiste-révolutionnaire, et je n’aime pas les conneries, voilaà tout (j’entends: Les
rêves qui se croient des vérités).”
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as the quintessential public intellectual (Baert, 2015; Boschetti, 1988). Indeed, in the
mid-1940s, Sartre became a French celebrity and even turned out to embody the figure
of the “politically committed intellectual.” His international recognition led him to be
awarded the 1964 Nobel Prize for Literature, an offer that he could afford the luxury
to refuse. Overall, his book sales were very good. This is especially true for his literary
writings, which often turned out to be bestsellers. When he died in April 1980, his
funeral was attended by a huge crowd, estimated at 50,000 people. As for Merleau-
Ponty, he became one of the foremost French philosophers of the period immediately
following the Second World War (Noble, 2011). He was made Professor at the
University of Lyon in 1948, holding the Chair of Child Psychology and Pedagogy at
the Sorbonne from 1949 to 1952, and was then the youngest ever to hold the most
prestigious position for a philosopher in France, the Chair of Philosophy at the
Collège de France.
In comparison, Naville’s career was less prestigious and far more hazardous. As we
explained in the first part of this article, Naville’s attitude led him to successively
leave the surrealist circles, the communist party, and the vocational psychologist
community. His materialist beliefs and strong interest in behaviorism can certainly be
regarded has having played a negative role in the development of his career. More-
over, contrary to Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, Naville did not follow the classic
academic pathway. Naville did not pass the agrégation de philosophie, a highly
competitive French examination designed to be an important part of the intellectual
training of an academic philosopher in France. Therefore, although he finally obtained
an academic position, his career is certainly not comparable with those of Sartre and
Merleau-Ponty. As an example, in 1992, after a long career throughout which he
published more than 40 original books, 40 translations, and approximately 250
articles, he found himself obliged to self-publish his last book, which was dedicated
to politics in Russia (Naville, 1992). As a consequence, it is not surprising that Naville
did not succeed in giving voice to behaviorism in France: He was clearly a minor
player as opposed to Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, and his eclectic interests did not help
to portray a clear image of behaviorism.
But the lack of interest in behaviorism in France presumably also has something to
do with the French political context. Indeed, right in the middle of the Second World
War, especially in occupied France, discussing behavior and freedom was definitely
political. During that time, French citizens were forced to choose between collabo-
rating with the Nazis or joining the Resistance. After the war and the fall of the
collaborationist Vichy government, France was swept by a wave of executions: the
épuration sauvage [savage purge]. The humiliation of the rapid defeat combined with
a long and painful occupation and the purge of collaborationists created a traumatic
experience for the French. This trauma led to the creation, just after the war, of a
national myth called résistancialisme [resistantialism] by Rousso (1991), which could
be described as a systematic exaggeration of the importance of the role of the
resistance during the war. In this context, studying how we behave and what free will
and responsibility are had acquired a very specific meaning. More specifically,
Sartre’s ideas about absolute freedom were certainly more appealing than Naville’s
deterministic ones. Likewise, Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to preserve subjectivity was
far more acceptable than Naville’s negation of the very concept of the subject. Above
all, existentialist ideas were more in line with what could be called the French national
narrative of the immediate postwar (Baert, 2015). This is especially true for Sartre’s
conception of freedom, which allowed the public to glorify those who chose to join
the resistance and to condemn those who chose to collaborate, whereas Naville’s
deterministic point of view took away the glory by eliminating the choice. However,
Naville’s absolute defeat by Sartre should be nuanced. As noted by Kemp (2014),
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Sartre’s ultimate understanding of freedom might well have been influenced by
behaviorism and presumably by Naville’s behaviorism:
In 1969 Sartre defined freedom as “this little movement which makes of a social being totally
conditioned a person who does not wholly render what she received from its conditioning”, adopting
behaviorist terminology and demonstrating striking rapprochement with the behaviorist line. (Kemp,
2014, p. 346)
Finally, as Braunstein (1999) accurately highlighted, there existed “an anti-
psychologist spell”46 in French thought from the end of the 1950s into the 1960s, that
is to say, exactly at the time when psychology was institutionalized in the French
university and proclaimed its independence from philosophy and medicine. Actually,
it was above all philosophers who provided most of the criticism of psychology, the
most famous of which came from philosopher Georges Canguilhem and took the form
of a conference delivered in 1956, titled “What is Psychology?”47 (Canguilhem,
1958). Psychology, he wrote, blends “philosophy without rigor, ethics without de-
mand, and medicine without control”48 (Canguilhem, 1958, p. 12). In the 1960s,
Canguilhem’s article was the foundation of a series of critiques of psy-knowledge in
intellectual circles leaning to the political left (Carroy, Ohayon, & Plas, 2006). In
emancipating itself from philosophy, psychology would be at risk of becoming a
discipline that served economic or political priorities dictated by the state. Not every
form of psychology, however, was rejected, but rather its marginal aspects that were
presented as the most scientific ones: experimental psychology and, more specifically,
behaviorism. Thus, Naville’s debate with Sartre and Merleau-Ponty is only a part of
a more general French criticism of psychology in general and of behaviorism in
particular.
An Unexpected Fate
However, a difficult reception does not imply a complete lack of reception.
Behaviorism interested some French intellectuals, but strangely enough, it was mostly
outside of “psy” circles and especially in the literary field. In an recent article, Kemp
(2014) recalled that in 1948, French literary critic Claude-Edmonde Magny coined the
expression “behaviorist novel.” According to Kemp, her purpose was not to charac-
terize the use of the theme of behavior modification through conditioning in Western
works like Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932), George Orwell’s 1984 (1949),
Antony Burgess’s Clockwork Orange (1962), or even Burrhus Frederic Skinner’s
Walden Two (1948):
Interestingly, the term behaviorist novel did not attach itself to texts like these but, in line with
Magny’s analysis of the contemporary American novel, became associated exclusively with the
fashion for impersonal narration offering an external perspective on the characters. (Kemp, 2014, p.
347)
Magny was well aware that those novelists were certainly influenced by the cinematic
viewpoint and its technical constraints in filmmaking, but she pointed out that
novelists, contrary to filmmakers, had chosen this constraint. In L’âge d=or du roman
américain [The Golden Age of the American Novel] (Magny, 1948), Magny analyzed
the work of several American novelists—like John Dos Passos, Ernest Hemingway,
John Steinbeck, or William Faulkner—and explained that
46 French original: “un moment antipsychologiste.”
47 French original: “Qu’est-ce que la psychologie?”
48 French original: “une philosophie sans rigueur, une éthique sans exigence et une médecine sans contrôle.”
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it is in America that the philosophical school one calls behaviorism flourished; it is defined by a bias
which holds what an external observer could perceive of the psychological life of a man or animal
as the only reality . . . which eliminates all that can only be known by the subject himself, by means
of an internal analysis; in short, which reduces psychological reality to a succession of behaviors,
such as gestures or facial expressions as well as speeches or screams. Nearly all American novelists
of the past twenty years, from Hemingway to Caldwell, seem to have unconsciously endorsed this
behaviorist view of Man: they provide us not with the feelings or thoughts of their characters, but
with the objective description of their actions, the stenography of their discourses, in short, the report
of their “conducts” in the face of a given situation.49 (Magny, 1948, p. 50)
At the same time, Sartre was also genuinely interested in those American novelists, even
though he never used the term “behaviorist novel.” Yet several times, he discussed the
specificity of American novelist’s literary style.50 This theoretical interest led him to use
this technique in his own literary work as early as 1939 (notably in L’Enfance d’un chef
[The Childhood of a Leader; Sartre, 1939b]51 and, especially, in his trilogy entitled Les
Chemins de la liberté [Roads to Freedom; Sartre, 1945, 1947a, 1949]52). As Sartre
explained in a article entitled “American Novelists in French Eyes” (Sartre, 1946c),
beginning during the interwar period, French novelists were influenced by several Amer-
ican novelists:
All around us clouds were gathering. There was war in Spain; the concentration camps were multiplying
in Germany, in Austria, in Czechoslovakia. War was menacing everywhere. Nevertheless analysis—
analysis aà la Proust, aà la James—remained our only literary method, our favorite procedure. But could it
take into account the brutal death of a Jew in Auschwitz, the bombardment of Madrid by the planes of
Franco? Here a new literature presented its characters to us synthetically. It made them perform before
our eyes acts which were complete in themselves, impossible to analyze, acts which it was necessary to
grasp completely with all the obscure power of our souls. (Sartre, 1946c, p. 117)
Paradoxically, Sartre claimed that deep psychological analysis (“aà la Proust”) prevents us
from fully understanding “what was going on in the souls of . . . characters” (Sartre,
1946c, p. 117). Instead of using introspection to describe the psychology of characters,
Sartre recommended following the technique used by several American novelists and by
fully describing how they act: “It is from their conduct that we must, as in life, reconstruct
their thought” (Sartre, 1946c, p. 117). Interestingly, Sartre’s and Magny’s interest in
“behaviorist novels” led to a debate in the French literary milieu. Nathalie Sarraute, a
French novelist close to the Nouveau Roman,53 published, between 1947 and 1956, a
series of articles in Les Temps Modernes and La Nouvelle Revue Française [The New
French Review], in which she criticized the use of the behaviorist technique in literature—
that is, third-person perspective combined with a disdain for subjectivity—and contrasted
it with a tradition derived from Proust—that is, a taste for psychological analysis
49 French original:
C’est en Amérique qu’a fleuri l’école philosophique qu’on appelle behaviourisme; elle se définit par un parti pris de
tenir pour seul réel, dans la vie psychologique d’un homme ou d’un animal, ce que pourrait en percevoir un observateur
purement extérieur . . . d’éliminer tout ce qui ne peut être connu que par le sujet lui-même, au moyen d’une analyse
intérieure; bref, de réduire la réalité psychologique aà une suite de comportements, dont les paroles ou les cris font d’ailleurs
partie au même titre que les gestes ou les jeux de physionomie. Presque tous les romanciers ame=ricains des vingt dernie‘res
anne=es, d’Hemingway a‘ Caldwell, semblent avoir inconsciemment adopte= cette vue behaviouriste de l’homme: Ils nous
donnent non pas les sentiments ou les pense=es de leurs personnages, mais la description objective de leurs actes, la
ste=nographie de leurs discours, bref, le proce‘s-verbal de leurs “conduites” devant une situation donne=e.
50 See, for instance, “Sartoris par W. Faulkner” (Sartre, 1938b), “A‘ propos de John Dos Passos et de 1919”
[About John Dos Passos and 1919] (Sartre, 1938a) or “A‘ propos de Le bruit et la fureur. La temporalite= chez
Faulkner” [About The Sound and the Fury. Temporality in Faulkner] (Sartre, 1939a).
51 For more details, see Besand (2013).
52 In this trilogy, Sartre explored the theoretical theme of existentialism throughout the story of Mathieu, a
socialist teacher of philosophy and his friends during the Second World War.
53 The Nouveau Roman is a French literary movement that appeared in the second part of the 20th century and
called into question the traditional modes of literary realism (Jefferson, 1980).
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(Sarraute, 1956). In that respect, as Kemp noticed, Sarraute’s work could be seen as the
antithesis to the “behaviorist novel.”54 Surprisingly, Naville was also interested in Sartre’s
literary style. Despite his severe criticism of the founder of existentialism, Naville
mentioned his admiration for Sartre’s literary work on several occasions: in Les conditions
de la liberté (1947), Naville pointed out that Les chemins de la liberté55 (Sartre, 1945,
1947a, 1949) was “one of the best literary pieces of this time”56 (Naville, 1947, p. 188).
Moreover, in an ambivalent obituary, he claimed that, overall, Sartre’s intellectual record
was negative but that he would be remembered for his writing style (Naville, 1980).
Finally, in 1963, when Naville published a new edition of his 1942 book about Watson’s
behaviorism, the dust jacket blurb mentioned the decisive influence of behaviorism in
literature: “Psychology of behavior not only played a capital role in psychology’s modern
development, but also exercised a decisive influence on the understanding of the great
American novelists”57 (Naville, 1963a, p. C4).
This is a very surprising statement because the book itself did not address this issue at
all. It was probably a marketing strategy designed by the publisher to expand readership
of the book, but it is definitely an invitation for the historian to further explore the cultural
aspects of the indigenization of behaviorism in the French context.
Conclusion
To sum up, we argue that three main factors played a significant role in the difficult
reception of Watson’s ideas in France: first, the weak position of Naville, the French
ambassador of behaviorism, in the French intellectual community. The versatility of his
interests combined with his revolutionary tendencies led him to always remain an outsider,
or as he once described himself, to embody the figure of “the damned behaviorist (Naville,
1987).” Second, exactly at the moment that behaviorism was introduced in France,
alternative theories defended by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty met with rapid and major
success. Both existentialism and phenomenology, which explicitly condemned Watson’s
theory, overshadowed behaviorism. Third, the specificity of the political context of
postwar France was clearly decisive. After the humiliation of the occupation by the Nazis,
the French audience was especially critical of any deterministic view of behavior, which
could be seen as a justification of collaboration. As a result, both existentialism and
phenomenology were more in line than behaviorism with what could be called the “French
national narrative” of the immediate postwar.
Overall, Naville’s failure to popularize behaviorism should be understood as the
counterpart of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty’s success in introducing existential phenome-
nology. Yet we do not claim that the very specific debate between Naville, Sartre, and
Merleau-Ponty is sufficient to fully explain the fate of Watson’s ideas in France. Further
54 For a more developed interpretation of Sarraute’s work, see Kemp (2014, 2018). Paradoxically, as Kemp
successfully demonstrated, Sarraute could be seen as one of the most “behaviorist writers”:
In her focus on mental life as a response to outside stimulus, her deconstruction of complex mental activity
into simple quasi-physiological movements, and her emphasis on the involuntary over the willed, Sarraute offers
a representation of psychology that has more in common with behaviorism, in the original sense of the word, than
any of the other writers considered here. As the most outspoken detractor of the “behaviorist novel,” it is a
parallel she would not have been pleased to acknowledge. (Kemp, 2014, p. 358)
55 We could even ask ourselves whether Naville’s title of his critique of existentialism and phenomenology—
The Conditions of Freedom—was not a reference to Sartre’s trilogy The Roads to Freedom. By using this title,
Naville pointed out that freedom is not a road with good and bad decisions that must be taken but that there are
conditions to freedom that are mostly independent of our choices.
56 French original: “Une des meilleures œuvres de ce temps.”
57 French original: “La psychologie du comportement n’a pas joué seulement un rôle capital dans le
développement de la psychologie moderne, mais a exercé aussi une influence décisive sur la conception des
grands romanciers américains.”
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research should study the role of French experimental psychologists in this history and the
effective implementation of behavior therapy in clinical practice. However, we think that,
using the example of behaviorism, this article clearly illustrates how the combination of
philosophical and political contexts can be decisive in the indigenization process of
scientific ideas.
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